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I. INTRODUCTION
For two months a pair of snipers terrorized the metropolitan areas
surrounding Washington D.C. When the pair was finally arrested on Octob(:r 24,
2002, they were suspected of fatally shooting a total of fourteen people.' Because
the shootings occurred in several states and the District of Columbia, statc and
federal prosecutors had to lobby Attorney General John Ashcroft for the right to
try the pair first.! Ashcroft chose Virginia because of its strong death penalty
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2004; B.S., Managerial
Economics, University of California, Davis, 2001.
1. Cam Simpson, Virginia Gets First Crack at Sniper Trials CHI. TRIB., Nov. 8, 2002, at Al.
2. Id.
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record3 and because Virginia law allows execution for seventeen-year-old
juvenile4 defendants
One of the suspected snipers, John Malvo, was seventeen years old when he
was arrested.6 Under current law, it is not unconstitutional to execute persons
who were juveniles at the time of committing their crime.7 Therefore, as Malvo's
trial approaches, he is subject to the death penalty if convicted.8 I will argue,
however, that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari to a juvenile defendant like
Malvo and hold that executing juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. Such a decision will be in line with the Court's
decision in Atkins v. Virginia9 and with the emerging "national consensus"
against executing juveniles.
On June 20, 2002, the United States Supreme Court held that executing
mentally retarded criminals was unconstitutional,' °  violating the Eighth
Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment." This categorical
rule, forbidding the execution of all mentally retarded criminals, marked a sharp
departure from the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Penry v. Lynaugh,2 which
declined to hold that, as a categorical rule, it was unconstitutional to execute the
mentally retarded. 3
The Court decided Stanford v. Kentucky 4 on the same day as it decided
Penry,"5 and declined to adopt a categorical rule banning the execution of
juveniles under the age of eighteen.'6 Although willing to hold sixteen as the
minimum age for execution a year earlier," the Court declined the opportunity to
3. See id. (stating that only Texas has executed more people than Virginia since capital punishment was
reinstated by the United States Supreme Court).
4. The term "juvenile" refers to a person who is under the age of eighteen.
5. CBSNews.com, Sniper Suspects in Va. Courtrooms Nov. 8, 2002, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories
/2002/11/08/national/printable528765.shtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
6. Simpson, supra note 1, at Al.
7. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (holding that sixteen is the minimum age for
executing juveniles); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (holding state statutes which permi
execution of sixteen and seventeen-year-old juveniles constitutional).
8. See Simpson, supra note I, at AI (stating that the death penalty was a "key factor" in Asheroft's
decision to let Virginia prosecute Malvo first).
9. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
10. Id. at 321.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
12. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
13. Id. at 335.
14. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
15. See id.; Penry, 492 U.S. at 302 (indicating that both cases were decided on June 26, 1989).
16. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380 (noting that no historical or modem societal consensus prohibited
executions of sixteen or seventeen-year-olds).
17. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (holding that "the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit the execution of a person" under sixteen at the time of the commission of the offense).
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raise that age to eighteen in Stanford.8 Therefore, as of 1989, the Court was
unwilling to establish categorical rules proscribing the execution of the mentally
retarded and juveniles aged sixteen and seventeen under the Eighth
Amendment. "9
In this Comment I will argue that the Supreme Court will follow suit with its
decision in Atkins v. Virginia ° and, upon granting certiorari for a defendant in a
state court, apply its reasoning in Atkins to hold that executing juveniles inder
the age of eighteen is unconstitutional as "cruel and unusual punishment," thus
violating the Eighth Amendment.
I will begin with a discussion of the legal background of the E ighth
Amendment issue, focusing mainly on Atkins and Stanford. Included will be a
brief discussion of the Supreme Court's recent denial of a writ of habeas c:rpus
from the original petitioner in Stanford.2 Next will be a discussion of Justice
O'Connor's key "swing vote" on the Court and a look at her signi ficant
concurring opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma. Then I will examine whether a
"national consensus" against executing juveniles exists. Finally, I will apply the
appropriate test, as set out by Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Thompsor, and
argue that, in light of Atkins, the Supreme Court will find the national cons ensus
that it did not find in Stanford, causing the Court to hold that juveniles as a class
lack the requisite culpability to be executed in accord with the Eighth
Amendment.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Penry v. Lynaugh
Johnny Paul Penry was convicted of murdering Pamela Carpenter in 1)79.22
Penry brutally beat, raped, and stabbed Carpenter.23 He was convicted of murder
and sentenced to death.24 The jury rejected his insanity defense in both the guilt
and sentencing phases of the trial.25 Penry, whose IQ measured between fift. and
sixty-three over several years,26 filed a writ of habeas corpus and was dnied
18. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
19. Id.; Penry, 492 U.S. at 340.
20. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
21. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 1097 (2002).
22. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307, 310.
23. Id. at 307.
24. Id. at 310-11.
25. Id. at 310.
26. See id. at 308 (stating that a person with an IQ in this range is considered mildly to mocerately
mentally retarded).
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relief in both the district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.27 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.28
Justice O'Connor, writing the opinion of the Court, held that the Eighth
Amendment did not prohibit Penry's execution because a national consensus
against such action did not exist.29 At the time of the Penry decision in 1989, only
Georgia and Maryland had banned the execution of the mentally retarded.0
Therefore, in not finding a consensus, the Court did not disturb Penry's death
sentence by denying him habeas corpus."
B. Atkins v. Virginia
Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted of murdering Eric Nesbitt in 1996.32
Atkins and an accomplice kidnapped Nesbitt, drove him to an ATM machine,
robbed him, drove him to a remote field, and shot him eight times.33 Atkins had
an IQ of fifty-nine.34 He was subsequently convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death in 1998."5 He appealed the sentence on numerous grounds,
including an argument that the Virginia death penalty statute was
unconstitutional.36 His sentence was reversed due to the inadequacy of the jury
form used in sentencing.37 On remand, Atkins was again sentenced to death, and
this time the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the sentence.38 Following the
Supreme Court of Virginia's second decision, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.3 9
27. Id. at 312.
28. See id. at 313.
29. Id. at 340 (noting that a national consensus against executing the mentally retarded may emerge in
the future, foreshadowing the Atkins decision).
30. Id. at 334.
31. Id. at 340.
32. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 309.
35. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445, 453 (Va. 1999).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 457.
38. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 314 (Va. 2000).
39. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 310 (2002).
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1. The Supreme Court's Reasoning in Atkins
40Writing for a 6-3 Court , Justice Stevens laid out the appropriate standard as
follows: The Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive sanctions4' and in
determining what is "excessive," the Court must apply a precept of
proportionality to determine whether the crime committed is punished in
proportion to the harm it caused. 4' According to the Court, the only required
inquiry into proportionality is under currently prevailing standards.43 This is
known as the "evolving standards of decency" test" and is measured, as much as
possible, by "objective factors" which tend to show a "national consensus"
414
against a particular type of punishment .
The test, therefore, is whether a national consensus exists.46 This is an
objective test, and the most important objective factor, agreed upon by all
members of the Court, is the legislation promulgated by the states.4 7 This inquiry
into state legislation is the most reliable guide for the Court to determine whether
a "national consensus" exists favoring the prohibition of executing certain
48groups.
Beyond the objective inquiry into state legislation, however, there is
disagreement as to whether subjective views of the Justices should factor into the
more general evolving standards of decency test.49 According to the Atkins
majority, it is the job of the Court to determine whether other reasons exist for
following or disregarding the presence of a national consensus. 0 These reasons
include analysis under the two death penalty rationales: deterrence and
40. See id. at 306 (commencing Justice Stevens's opinion for the majority); id. at 321 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (commencing the dissenting opinions by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice
Thomas).
41. Id. at 311. In addition, the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishments regardless of
whether they are excessive. Id. at 311 n.7.
42. Id. at 311-12.
43. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion)).
44. Id.
45. See id. at 312 (stating that "the 'clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values
is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures' (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989))).
46. This is the same "national consensus" test as the one applied inPenry. See supra Part II.A.
47. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312; see also id. at 340 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing legislation as the most
important objective factor); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989) (discussing legislation as being the
foremost objective indicator of public opinion); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) (locking first to
state legislatures as evidence of a national consensus).
48. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (including the Court's statement asserting that legislation
is the primary indicator of the nation's values).
49. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is no precedent or authority
for the Court to act on its agreement or disagreement with a "national consensus" of state legislatures).
50. Id. at 313.
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retribution." Purporting to find such a consensus, the majority did not base its
holding exclusively on "subjective intentions."52
2. National Consensus Exists
In 1989, when Penry v. Lynaugh was decided, only two death penalty states
categorically prohibited the execution of mentally retarded inmates. 3
Consequently, the Court concluded that a national consensus against executing
mentally retarded inmates did not exist. 4
Since Penry, however, sixteen states have adopted statutes that ban the
execution of mentally retarded inmates.5 Therefore, at the time of the Atkins
decision, eighteen of the thirty-eight death penalty states prohibited the execution
of the mentally retarded. 6 This state legislative reaction to Penry was a large
factor in the Court's national consensus analysis in Atkins. 7
The Court was also persuaded by the fact that, in the thirteen years between
Penry and Atkins, no state that had banned execution of the mentally retarded
attempted to repeal its legislation.5 In addition, some states purporting to allow
the execution of mentally retarded inmates had not actually carried out such an
execution in decades. 9 Finally, between the Penry decision in 1989 and Atkins in
2002, only five inmates with an IQ below seventy had been executed in the
United States."
These factors, coupled with the short time frame between Penry and Atkins,
led the Court to conclude in Atkins that society in general viewed the mentally
retarded as categorically less culpable than "normal" criminals.' This view was
stated in both state legislation and state practice, and the Court concluded that a
51. See id. at 3 18-20 (discussing the rationales of retribution and deterrence and their applicability to the
imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded).
52. See id. at 321 (stating that the Court's independent evaluation of the issue was not in conflict with
that of the legislatures); see also infra Part I .C (discussing Stanford v. Kentucky). It appears that, upon finding a
national consensus, Justice Scalia, and possibly Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, would end the
inquiry and impose a categorical rule. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 376 (stating that a procedure may be declared
unconstitutional "only if there is a consensus").
53. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989) (stating that Georgia and Maryland were the only
two states which prohibited the execution of the mentally retarded before Penry).
54. Id.
55. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 315-16.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 316.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 3 15-16; see also id. at 318 n.24 (citing additional evidence that mentally retarded criminals
may be less culpable as a class than "normal" criminals).
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national consensus opposed to the execution of the mentally retarded did indeed
exist."
3. Effect of National Consensus
After finding that a national consensus against executing mentally retarded
inmates existed, the Court concluded that this established society's belief that the
mentally retarded can never have enough moral culpability to be subject to the
death penalty.63 To justify this conclusion, the Court looked at the two rationales
for the death penalty, retribution and deterrence, and determined that these goals
could not be met with respect to the mentally retarded.6' If the death penalty does
not meet one or both of the stated rationales, it becomes the "needless imposition
of pain and suffering" and is thus unconstitutional. 5 This portion of the Court's
reasoning is deemed to be the controversial "subjective" aspect of the Eighth
Amendment test.
66
Retribution necessarily depends on culpability. 7 Since the death penalty is
not imposed on the "average murderer, ' 68 and since the mentally retarded
murderer cannot be more culpable than the "average murderer," it follows
logically that the death penalty cannot be imposed on the mentally retarded
murderer, at least using retribution as the theory of punishment.
69
Capital punishment as a deterrent can only be effective when the murder is
premeditated and deliberate.7 ° Due to cognitive and behavioral impairments
suffered by the mentally retarded, they posses a diminished capacity to
62. Id. at 3 16. The Court also looked at other factors, including stances against these executions taken by
the American Bar Association, the American Psychological Association, religious communities, and even the
world community. Id. at 316 n.21. Furthermore, it was left to the states to determine who is actually mentally
retarded. Id. at 317. Chief Justice Rehnquist vigorously dissented on this method of analysis. Id. at 321-23
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 318-19.
64. Id. at 318-20.
65. Id. (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)).
66. Id. at 348-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. See id. at 319 (the retribution rationale is concerned with whether the offender gets his "just
desserts" by the punishment imposed).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 319-20. The Court assumes that the mentally retarded murderer cannot be as culpable as the
average murderer, presumably through its "national consensus" finding in which it concludes that society has
determined that culpability is necessarily decreased for the mentally retarded murderer.
70. Id. at 319 (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799).
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"premeditate" and "deliberate" prior to committing a murder.7 Therefore, they
cannot be deterred from committing what is essentially an "impulse" murder.
72
Thus, because the mentally retarded lack the sufficient cognitive and
behavioral aspects needed to trigger either death penalty rationale, the imposition
of the death penalty is excessive and violates the Eighth Amendment's
proscription against excessive punishment.73 Therefore, the Court felt compelled
to follow the national consensus against executing the mentally retarded 4
As additional support for its new categorical rule, the Court noted that the
general lack of capacity of the mentally retarded led it to believe that "the death
penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe
penalty. ' 75 Among other things, the Court noted that mentally retarded defendants
make poor witnesses, cannot effectively assist counsel at trial, and may be less
persuasive in offering evidence to be considered in mitigation.7 6 Additionally,
offering the fact of mental retardation as a mitigating factor may actually hurt the
case for a reduced sentence because a jury may determine that factor actually
indicates a likelihood of future dangerousness 7 These findings, however, were
dicta, as the Court's holding did not purport to rest upon the determination of
these facts.8
4. Conclusion
The Court's two-part reasoning in Atkins consisted of (1) determining
whether a national consensus against executing mentally retarded defendants
existed, and (2) if such a consensus existed, whether the Court, in its own
independent evaluation, agreed with the consensus. 9 This independent evaluation
included an evaluation of whether the death penalty, as applied to the mentally
retarded, advanced the overall deterrence and retribution rationales of the death
71. See id. at 320 (stating that mentally retarded defendants have "cognitive and behavioral impairments"
such as "the diminished ability to understand and process information, to learn from experience, to engage in
logical reasoning, [and] to control impulses").
72. See id. at 319-20 (noting that the deterrent as to "normal" criminals would not be affected by this
result. The Court, however, did not discuss the issue of whether a mentally retarded defendant had the requisite
abilities to be convicted of first degree murder).
73. See id. at 318-20 (considering the national consensus and the rationales for the death penalty of
deterrence and retribution, and concluding that the execution of mentally retarded defendants violates the
Eighth Amendment).
74. Id. As mentioned, the majority's test went a step further than determining the existence of a national
consensus. Because the majority test had room for "subjective" viewpoints, the lack of retribution or deterrence
supported the national consensus and compelled the majority to go along with the national consensus. Id.
75. Id. at 320 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)).
76. Id. at 320-21.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See supra Parts II.B. 1-3 (describing the Court's reasoning in Atkins).
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penalty." Apparently, the issue of whether a national consensus existed was a
threshold matter, and if no consensus was found, the Court would not have
proceeded to conduct its own evaluation of the merits."
Thus, applying the national consensus test articulated in Penry, the Court
reached a different result from Penry in the face of a newly found national
82
consensus.
C. Stanford v. Kentucky
In order to advance the argument that the Supreme Court will overrule
Stanford v. Kentucky upon granting certiorari to a future defendant, it would be
appropriate to briefly discuss the Court's reasoning in Stanford. Since Stanford,
the Supreme Court has not granted certiorari to a sixteen or seventeen-year-old
defendant challenging his or her death sentence as excessive punishment under
the Eighth Amendment.
In Stanford, decided in 1989, the Court upheld the death sentences of both a
sixteen-year-old and a seventeen-year-old petitioner." Kevin Stanford was
convicted of a murder he committed in Kentucky in 1981 when he was seventeen
years old." He was sentenced to death, and his sentence was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Kentucky.85 Heath Wilkins was also sentenced to death for
murder. 6 The murder Wilkins was convicted of occurred in 1985, when he was
sixteen years old . His death sentence was affirmed by the Missouri Supreme
Court."
The issue in Stanford, similar to the issue in Atkins, was whether a class of
inmates, in this case juveniles above the age of fifteen, could be executed in
accord with the Eighth Amendment." Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,9"
stated that the juvenile petitioners could argue either that (1) the execution of
juveniles was unconstitutional when the Bill of Rights was adopted or (2)
80. See supra Part ll.B.3 (considering the appropriateness of imposing the death penalty on the mentally
retarded based on the rationales of deterrence and retribution).
81. See id. at 328 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (stating that "[t]here are strong reasons for limiting our
inquiry into" national consensus). Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that no national consensus existed and did
not consider any "subjective" question. His view is in line with Justice Scalia's reasoning in Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). See infra Part I.C (discussing Stanford v. Kentucky).
82. See supra Part I.A-B (discussing Penry and Atkins).
83. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
84. Id. at 365-66.
85. Id. at 366.
86. Id. at 367.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 368.
89. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 368. As stated, the Stanford case was the consolidated appeal of a sixteen-year-
old and a seventeen-year-old defendant. The age difference of the petitioners made no difference to the outcome
of the case.
90. Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens dissented. Id. at 382-405.
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execution of juveniles has become unconstitutional under "evolving standards of
decency." 9' At the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, sixteen and
seventeen-year-olds were executed, so the petitioners were left to argue under the
"evolving standards of decency" test.92 The inquiry under "evolving standards of
decency" is whether state legislatures have condemned the practice in issue. 93
This objective inquiry is identical to the one used in Penry and Atkins.94 After
examining the actions of state legislatures, the Court concluded that a "national
consensus" against executing juveniles aged sixteen and seventeen did not exist. 95
Of the thirty-seven death penalty states in 1989, nineteen did not impose a
minimum age by statute.96 Combining these states with states that imposed
sixteen or seventeen as a minimum age,97 it was theoretically possible that
sixteen-year-olds could be executed in twenty-two of the thirty-seven death
penalty states and that seventeen-year-olds could be executed in twenty-five of
the thirty-seven death penalty states. 9 Because approximately half of the death
penalty states permitted (or at least did not prohibit by statute) the execution of
sixteen and seventeen-year-olds, the Court concluded that the practice of
executing juveniles was not "unusual" and therefore not proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment.99 In concluding its analysis, the Court noted that "punishment is
either 'cruel and unusual . . .' or it is not."'0' The Court held that, absent a
legislation-based national consensus forbidding the execution of juveniles,
petitioners' death sentences were not in violation of the Eighth Amendment."'
Unlike the Atkins Court, the Court in Stanford did not look further than state
legislation in determining whether a national consensus against these executions
existed.' 2 The Stanford petitioners had argued that, because juveniles were
91. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 368-69 (determining that, because defendants could not make the historical
argument based on the Bill of Rights, they were only left with the option of arguing that their executions would
violate "evolving standards of decency").
92. Id.
93. Id. at 369-70.
94. See supra Part II.A (discussing the test applied in Penry); Part II.B.I (discussing the analysis in
A tkins).
95. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
96. Id. at 371 n.3.
97. It is unconstitutional to execute anybody who was under the age of sixteen at the time of the
commission of the punishable crime. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
98. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370 (stating that, of the thirty-seven states that permit the death penalty,
fifteen refuse to impose that sentence on sixteen-year-olds, and twelve refuse to impose it on seventeen-year-
olds); see also id. at 371 (concluding that the state legislation present did not establish the degree of national
consensus sufficient to hold the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to juveniles).
99. Id.
100. See id. at 378 (noting that petitioners theoretically need to persuade the American people, and not
the Supreme Court, as the Court's role is limited to identifying the "evolving standards of decency," not
determining what they should be).
101. Id.at380.
102. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (describing some of the other factors considered by
the Court in Atkins).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 34
treated so differently from non-juveniles in other areas of the law, a consensus
could be implied from examining these laws, including laws regarding driving,
drinking alcohol and voting.0 3 The Court rejected this implied consensus
argument however, reasoning that the criminal justice system provided an
individualized determination of culpability for punishment, whereas the law in
these other areas merely judged juveniles "in gross," not looking at individual
cases.'°4 Thus, under the Court's reasoning, some juveniles would have sufficient
capacity to drive, vote, and drink alcohol if these privileges were granted
individually rather than in gross.' 5 Similarly, some juveniles would have
sufficient culpability to be sentenced to death. °6
The Court could have stopped when it concluded that a national consensus
did not exist.' 7 However, the Court addressed and rejected the petitioners' final
argument, that executing juveniles failed to meet both the deterrence and the
retribution rationales of the death penalty."0
The Court rejected the petitioners' deterrence/retribution argument,' 9
concluding that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not
the Eighth Amendment, would apply if the penological goals of capital
punishment failed to apply to a particular class of inmates." Because the parties
did not make an Equal Protection Clause argument, the Court did not reach the
merits of this argument, although it noted that only rational basis review would
apply to such a classification."' The last part of the Court's opinion, rejecting the
deterrence/retribution arguments, was dicta however, and it represented the views
of only four Justices.' 
2
Justice O'Connor concurred, applying her two-part test from Thompson v.
Oklahoma,"3 reasoning that, in the absence of a national consensus, states do not
need to impose a minimum age for execution in their respective death penalty
statutes. The second part of her two-part test, considering minimum age
103. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 374.
104. Id. at 374-75.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 375 (noting, however, that age was always to be used as a mitigating factor at
sentencing).
107. See supra Part lI.B (discussing the analysis in Atkins).
108. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377-78.
109. Justice O'Connor did not join this part of the Court's opinion. Id. at 364; see also id. at 380-82
(providing Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion). Thus, this part of the opinion is a plurality view.
110. Id.at378.
11. See id. (noting that a Fourteenth Amendment argument, even if made, would likely fail because
such a classification would be rationally related to legitimate state interests).
112. Id The four Justices were Scalia, White, Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
113. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 848 (1988) (commencing Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion); see also infra Part Il.E (discussing that opinion); Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (describing the two-part test).
114. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (claiming that illustrating specificity or
lack thereof is not a constitutional problem when no national consensus exists).
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requirements for states to impose the death penalty, was not triggered because
Justice O'Connor agreed with the Court that a national consensus against
executing juveniles, the first part of the inquiry under her test, did not exist.'15
Against this backdrop, it is clear that without a national consensus, as
evidenced by state legislatures, the imposition of the death penalty on a particular
class of inmates is not "cruel and unusual" punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. Although the Justices may disagree on what actually constitutes a
national consensus, ' 6 the test is not disputed. What is disputed is whether, upon
finding a consensus, subjective views of the Justices should determine whether
the consensus should be followed." 7 Nonetheless, the national consensus test,
deemed to mark the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society,"' 8 is the key in analyzing claims under the "cruel and unusual"
clause of the Eighth Amendment.
D. In re Stanford
The Supreme Court did not see the last of petitioner Kevin Stanford after it
upheld his death sentence in 1989. On October 21, 2002, Stanford petitioned the
Court for a writ of habeas corpus." 9 This petition was denied, with Justice
Stevens filing a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer.'20
One argument advanced by Justice Stevens in dissent was that, in light of
Atkins, the Court needed to re-open the issue of whether juveniles as a class had
the requisite culpability to be executed.'' He also relied heavily on Justice
Brennan's dissent in Stanford v. Kentucky, 22 which accepted petitioners'
argument that, because society treats juveniles so differently in all other areas of
life, it should also withhold the death penalty as a punishment for crimes
committed as a juvenile. 23 Justice Brennan had argued that society treated
juveniles differently because their cognitive reasoning abilities and empathy have
115. Id. at 381 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
116. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 322 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (Chief Justice
Rehnquist, along with Justices Thomas and Scalia, did not find a rational consensus to exist in Atkins while the
majority did find a national consensus to exist).
117. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (describing the dispute concerning this subjective
component of the inquiry).
118. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
119. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968 (2002).
120. Id. at 968-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Atkins and was
joined by these other three Justices, as well as Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, in that opinion. Atkins, 536 U.S.
at 305.
121. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. at 971-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 382, 405 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. at 969-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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not yet developed fully. 12 4 Therefore, because they lack such abilities, they can
never have enough culpability to justify the imposition of the death penalty.'25
The main argument of Justice Stevens, however, was that since the 1989
Stanford decision, a national consensus against executing juveniles had
developed, and thus the Court was obligated to re-open the issue on petitioner
Stanford's writ of habeas corpus. 126 In the years following the original Stanford
decision, four state legislatures had banned juvenile executions,"' and a fifth state
banned juvenile executions by judicial decision.'28 Whether the actions of these
five states, coupled with the pre-existing legislation of other states actually
constitutes a consensus will be discussed in Part III.
Although the writ of habeas corpus was denied, Justice Stevens's dissent was
significant for a number of reasons. First, it was joined by three other Justices,"'
and with four votes the Court will grant certiorari in almost all cases. ° It is
logical to assume that Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer would vote
to grant certiorari to a juvenile defendant sentenced to death in a state court. Thus
the Court would need to decide on the merits whether executing juveniles was
indeed prohibited by the Eighth Amendment by re-opening the national
consensus issue as applied to juveniles."'
A second significance of Justice Stevens's dissent is that it showed that a
national consensus may exist against executing juveniles and that, since the
original Stanford decision, more states had banned such executions. ' As
discussed earlier, finding a national consensus is vital to determine whether,
under evolving standards of decency, a punishment is cruel and unusual and thus
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment."'
Although some Justices may disagree on what exactly constitutes a "national
consensus,"'3 4 it appears that Justices Kennedy and O'Connor are more willing to
find such a consensus than their colleagues Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas. Justice Kennedy did not find a consensus in Stanford and
124. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. at 394-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. at 971-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 969-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting). These states are Indiana, Montana, New York, and Kansas.
128. Id. at 969 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Washington's Supreme Court held that juveniles could no
longer be executed in Washington in State v. Furman, 858 P.2d 1092, 1103 (Wash. 1993).
129. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. at 968.
130. See ROBERT L. STERN, ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 261-62 (6th ed. 1986) (discussing the
history of the "Rule of Four" and how in certain circumstances the votes of only two or three Justices may be
necessary to grant certiorari).
131. See infra Part Ill (discussing the question of whether there is such a consensus).
132. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. at 968-69, 971-72 (Stevens J., dissenting).
133. See supra Part l.B.2. and Part I.C (illustrating the Court's implementation of the national
consensus test).
134. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (including a majority opinion asserting that there
was a national consensus and two dissenting opinions disputing that assertion).
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thus joined Justice Scalia's plurality opinion.'35 However, in Atkins, Justice
Kennedy agreed with Justice Stevens and the majority that a consensus existed.
36
Justice O'Connor is the only Justice to vote with the majority in Thompson,
Stanford, Penry, and Atkins.'37 However, because she joined the Atkins majority
opinion but merely concurred in Stanford, it is reasonable to assume that she is
more flexible than Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, who
seem hesitant to find a "consensus" unless a significant majority of states ban a
certain type of punishment.'38 Justice O'Connor's "swing vote" is crucial in
deciding whether a consensus exists and therefore deciding that executing
juveniles is unconstitutional.
If Justice Stevens is correct in his determination that a consensus does
exist, 39 it appears that the Court would have enough votes to overrule Stanford.
Of course, merely labeling something a "national consensus" and thus
concluding that a punishment is barred by the Eighth Amendment's adherence to
evolving standards of decency does not end the inquiry. Justice Stevens garnered
three additional votes that agree with his view of a "consensus.' 40 However, at
least one other member of the Court would need to be convinced that a consensus
did in fact exist for the Court to overrule Stanford. This member, I argue, is
Justice O'Connor. It is appropriate therefore to determine whether a national
consensus, as viewed by Justice O'Connor, exists to overrule Stanford.'4' To do
this, it is important to look at her concurring opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma.
E. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence in Thompson v. Oklahoma
In Thompson, fifteen-year-old William Wayne Thompson was convicted of
first degree murder in the State of Oklahoma and subsequently sentenced to
death. "'42 On appeal, Thompson argued that a death sentence for a fifteen-year-old
was cruel and unusual punishment barred by the Eighth Amendment. 3 The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed, holding that, because Thompson
135. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 364 (1989).
136. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 305.
137. Id.; Stanford, 492 U.S. at 363; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 306 (1989); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 817 (1988). Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Thompson is discussed in Part IE,
infra.
138. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 337 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(demonstrating that the dissenting opinions by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia emphasized that
merely half of the death penalty states banning a punishment does not constitute a national consensus on the
issue). Justice Thomas signed on with both opinions. Id. at 321, 337.
139. See infra Part Ill (discussing whether a consensus, shaped by Atkins, does exist).
140. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 968 (2002).
141. This of course assumes that Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer will remain consistent
with their positions taken in both Atkins and In re Stanford.
142. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 818-20.
143. Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986).
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had been tried as an adult, any and all punishments applicable to adults could
apply to him, including the death penalty.
14 4
The Supreme Court in Thompson, much like the Courts in Stanford and
Atkins, was very divided. Justice Stevens wrote the plurality opinion and was
joined by Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun. 45 Justice Scalia dissented,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White. 46 Justice Kennedy did not
participate. 47 Thus, had Justice O'Connor voted with the Scalia faction, the case
would have split 4-4. However, she concurred in the judgment of the Court'48
and, as is often the case, her "swing vote" decided the outcome of the case.1
4 9
Although Thompson was decided before Stanford, Penry, and Atkins, the
Court's reasoning in Thompson was similar to those later cases. Justice Stevens's
plurality opinion was structured similarly to his majority opinion in Atkins. At
issue in Thompson was whether the execution of an inmate who was fifteen years
old at the time of the offense was unconstitutional as being cruel and unusual
punishment.'50 The plurality found that a national consensus existed in favor of
prohibiting such executions by looking at state capital punishment statutes and
inferring that, because no state explicitly authorized the execution of a fifteen-
year-old, a national consensus existed.'' Similarly, as in Atkins, the plurality
(authored by Justice Stevens, the only member of this plurality still on the Court)
also concluded that executing such young inmates did not meet the goals of the
death penalty, deterrence and retribution.'52
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion was based in large part on the finding
of a national consensus.'53 Although she warned against accepting such a
consensus as a matter of constitutional law,'5 4 Justice O'Connor would not have
voted with the plurality had there not been a national consensus."'
144. Id.
145. Thompson v. Oklahoma 487 U.S. at 818.
146. Id. at 859 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 817.
148. Id. at 848 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment of the Court).
149. See Joan Biskupic, Justice O'Connor and Affirmative Actio, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1997, at AO1
(describing how Justice O'Connor normally votes with the "conservative" Justices, but strays enough to be
considered a key "swing vote" on a variety of issues).
150. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. at 818-19.
151. See id. at 829 (limiting the Court's examination of legislation to states which had actually
addressed the issue of whether or not there is a minimum age below which a juvenile could not, in accord with
the Constitution, be executed. Those states which addressed the issue unanimously determined that no juvenile
under sixteen could be executed).
152. Id. at 836-37; see also supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Atkins Court's consideration of deterrence
and retribution).
153. Id. at 849 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
154. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
155. Because she did not find a national consensus to exist in Stanford, Justice O'Connor joined much
of the majority opinion in that case. However, she wrote separately there to emphasize that if she found a
consensus to exist in Stanford, she may have gone the other way. Therefore, the consensus issue, according to
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Justice O'Connor's main disagreement with the plurality was that they
decided the case on grounds that were too broad.' Oklahoma's death penalty
statute, like similar statutes in many other states, did not set a minimum age
below which no person could be executed.'57 Because fifteen-year-old defendants
could be tried as adults for murder, it was thus possible for a fifteen-year-old to
be executed in Oklahoma, and petitioner Thompson was therefore sentenced to
death in accord with state law."8
The plurality held that, as a categorical rule, fifteen-year-olds could not
constitutionally be executed. 59 Justice O'Connor agreed that petitioner Thompson's
death sentence was unconstitutional, but did not want to go so far as to hold that,
categorically, no fifteen-year-old could ever be executed under the Eighth
Amendment.' Instead, her analysis focused on state death penalty legislation and,
more specifically, death penalty states that imposed a minimum age for death
sentences.' Every state which imposed a minimum age set that age at sixteen or
above.'62 Thus, no state explicitly authorized the execution of fifteen-year-olds.'
According to Justice O'Connor, this lack of express authorization in any state was
enough of a consensus to meet her "threshold" and, if appropriate, would lead to her
second inquiry: whether states must explicitly impose a minimum age in death
penalty statutes.'6 Because the Oklahoma death penalty statute did not specify a
minimum age, and because she found a sufficient consensus, Justice O'Connor voted
with the plurality to strike down Thompson's death sentence.
65
Justice O'Connor and in line with the rest of the Court, is a "threshold." See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361, 380-81 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing the absence of a national consensus).
156. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 849 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (preferring to decide the broad question
of whether any fifteen-year-old may ever constitutionally be executed another time and only with better
"consensus" evidence).
157. Id. at 857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
158. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the imprecise Oklahoma statute was of "dubious
constitutionality" because of its lack of careful consideration regarding a minimum age).
159. Id. at 838.
160. Id. at 855 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
161. Id. at 849-51 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 849 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 852 (O'Connor, J., concurring). At the time Thompson was decided, eighteen states provided
a minimum age for executions. Id. at 829. Oklahoma was one of nineteen states which "theoretically" could
impose the death penalty on a fifteen-year-old because the statute was not specific as to age. See supra note 144
and accompanying text (discussing the Oklahoma Statute and the fact that, in Oklahoma, fifteen-year-olds could
be tried as adults).
164. See id. at 858 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This second issue, whether a statute explicitly authorizing
execution of fifteen-year-olds would be constitutional, was not before the Court and thus not addressed by
Justice O'Connor. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Oklahoma lost because of its imprecise statute and in light of
the national consensus against executing fifteen-year-olds. See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text
(discussing Justice O'Connor's opinion concerning national consensus and Oklahoma's statute).
165. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 859 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Justice O'Connor's test did not require a definite or concrete national
consensus. 66 Although she leaned toward finding one there, she also made it
clear that by no means was there a clear-cut consensus on this issue.' 6 1 Only when
a national consensus clearly does not exist may a state not explicitly provide a
minimum age for imposing death sentences under Justice O'Connor's test.'
68
Thus, the issue for Justice O'Connor was not whether executing fifteen-year-olds
was unconstitutional but whether, with some evidence of a national consensus, a
state's death penalty statute can be ambiguous as to the minimum age required
for execution. 6 1 Once finding a consensus against executing a particular class of
people, Justice O'Connor would not allow an ambiguous death penalty statute to
be applied to that class.7 Therefore, Justice O'Connor did not address the
question of whether a state statute explicitly authorizing the execution of fifteen-
year-olds could survive constitutional scrutiny. 7'
Justice O'Connor's complex method of reasoning set forth in Thompson and
later applied in Stanford emphasized the need for precision and clarity in state
legislation. In cases involving line-drawing for the possible execution of juvenile
defendants, it is not difficult for a state to be precise in its legislation by stating
that no person under the age of X can be executed. Because this degree of
precision is lacking in the field of mentally retarded defendants, Justice
O'Connor did not apply her Thompson test to the facts of Atkins. Rather, she
simply signed on to the majority opinion.' However, when the Court grants
certiorari for a juvenile defendant, it appears likely that Justice O'Connor will
continue to apply the standard she laid out in Thompson to determine whether the
practice of executing juveniles is indeed unconstitutional. Thus, because of the
split on the Court,'73 a state which purports to authorize the execution of juveniles
will likely have to pass her two-part Thompson test to maintain the ability to
execute juveniles.7 4
166. See id. at 848-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that a national consensus "likely does
exist").
167. Id. at 857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
168. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
169. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Compare this statement of the issue to
Stanford, where according to Justice O'Connor it was clear that no national consensus existed as to sixteen and
seventeen-year-olds. Thus, the issue of specificity in death penalty statutes was not reached. She made it clear,
however, that she was applying her Thompson two-part test to Stanford. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380-81
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
170. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 859 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
171. See id. at 858-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the plurality went too far in adjudicating
this constitutional issue). See supra note 156 (noting that Justice O'Connor preferred to avoid the broader
constitutional question).
172. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 305 (2002).
173. See supra Part II.D (discussing In re Stanford).
174. This assumes that Justice Kennedy will continue to vote with the conservative Justices in juvenile
cases, creating a 4-4 situation in which Justice O'Connor would supply the tie-breaking vote.
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Now I shall turn to the issue of whether a national consensus regarding the
proscription of juvenile executions exists. To do this, I will examine various state
legislation.
111. NATIONAL CONSENSUS AGAINST JUVENILE EXECUTIONS?
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1989 Stanford v. Kentucky decision, twelve of
thirty-seven "5 death penalty states prohibited the execution of juvenile
defendants.16 This number of states was held in Stanford to be insufficient
evidence of a national consensus against executing juveniles, and the death
sentence of two juveniles was upheld.'"
As pointed out in Justice Stevens's dissent in In re Stanford,' four death
penalty states have enacted legislation after 1989 banning the execution of
juveniles. "9 Thus, sixteen of the thirty-eight death penalty states now prohibit the
execution of juveniles by statute.8 '
This number of states banning the execution of juveniles is close to the
number of states, eighteen, which had banned the execution of the mentally
retarded before Atkins v. Virginia.' ' Although state legislation is the most
"objective" factor in determining the existence of a national consensus,'82 a
decision by the Supreme Court of Washington banning the execution of juveniles
would also likely be considered "objective evidence" of that state's position on
this issue. Thus, the number of death penalty states expressly prohibiting the
execution of juveniles may be seventeen, which is one less than the number of
states held to be a national consensus in Atkins.'
175. In 1994, Kansas became the thirty-eighth state to authorize capital punishment. See Death Penalty
Information Center, Kansas, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=1 l&did=502 (last visited Oct.
21, 2003) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that Kansas reenacted the death penalty on
April 22, 1994); see also Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Death Penalty Information, at
http://www.deathpenalty-info.org/article.php?scid=l l&did=121 (last visited Oct. 21, 2003) (copy on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (indicating "[t]here are currently [thirty-eight] states with the death penalty").
176. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989).
177. See supra Part II.C (indicating the holding and reasoning in Stanford).
178. See supra Part 1I.D (discussing In re Stanford and Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion therein).
179. See supra Part l.D.
180. Washington has not enacted legislation banning the death penalty for juveniles but has outlawed the
practice by judicial decision. See supra note 128 (discussing the fact that Washington's Supreme Court has
prohibited the execution of juveniles in that state). Thus Washington would be the seventeenth death penalty
state to prohibit juvenile executions.
181. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the determination in Atkins that a national consensus opposed to
the execution of the mentally retarded did exist based on the increasing number of states prohibiting such
executions).
182. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
183. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-15 (2002) (discussing state legislation prohibiting the
execution of the mentally retarded).
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In addition, four more death penalty states prohibit the execution of sixteen-
year-olds.14 Thus, nineteen states ban the execution of sixteen-year-olds by
statute and two more states ban the execution of sixteen-year-old by judicial
decision. Therefore, a total of twenty-one states ban the execution of sixteen-
year-olds, which is greater than the consensus found in Atkins.'5
The movement towards banning the execution of juveniles is very similar to
the post-Penry movement in state legislatures banning the execution of the
mentally retarded.8 6 According to Justice Stevens, this is sufficient evidence of a
national consensus to overrule Stanford v. Kentucky and introduce a categorical
rule banning the execution of juveniles.'87 Thus Justice O'Connor and her
Thompson test are critical; if she agrees with Justice Stevens, then Stanford v.
Kentucky will be overruled. I will next argue that Justice O'Connor will indeed
find that executing juveniles under the age of eighteen is unconstitutional, giving
the Court the majority it needs to overrule Stanford v. Kentucky.
IV. APPLYING THE "O'CONNOR TEST"
In accordance with all Eighth Amendment cases, the "threshold" issue is
whether a national consensus, as evidenced by objective factors, exists regarding
the execution of juveniles.'88 Justice O'Connor would likely find evidence that a
consensus exists, much like she did in her Thompson concurrence.'89 Therefore,
the consensus issue would be resolved, and Justice O'Connor would proceed to
the second part of her test.' 9° Because seventeen death penalty states prohibit the
execution of all juveniles, and twenty-one prohibit the execution of juveniles
under the age of seventeen, it would be hard to argue that evidence of a national
consensus does not exist. 9' This standard, it seems, is not a high one, and, as
Justice O'Connor noted in her Thompson concurrence, it would therefore be
unconstitutional to execute juveniles under a statute that "specifies no minimum
age."'92 Indeed, in her concurring opinion in Thompson, Justice O'Connor noted
184. These states are: Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 17-9-3 (1997)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-17 (1988)); Texas (TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.07(c) (2002)); and Florida (Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1,
6 (Fla. 1999)).
185. See supra Part Il.B.2 (discussing the national consensus found in Atkins).
186. See supra Part Il.B.2 (discussing the increasing number of states that had enacted legislation
prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded).
187. See supra Part II.D (discussing Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion in In re Stanford). Justice
Stevens's view is joined by Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 968 (2002)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. See supra Part II.E (discussing Justice O'Connor's opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma).
189. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 858 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
190. See supra Part II.E (describing Justice O'Connor's two-part test).
191. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also supra Part II.E (discussing
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma).
192. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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that there was "significant affirmative evidence of a national consensus."' 9 As
noted earlier, merely some evidence of a national consensus suffices for Justice
O'Connor to proceed to the second part of her test, whether the statute must be
precise. 194
Justice O'Connor went out of her way to state that she did not find a clear-cut
consensus in Thompson.'95 In the case of a new juvenile defendant, however,
there is more than merely some evidence of a national consensus. As mentioned
earlier,'96 the legislative "consensus" against executing juveniles is sixteen out of
thirty-eight states. Washington's Supreme Court decision makes it seventeen out
of thirty-eight death penalty states that outlaw the execution of juveniles. 197 In
Thompson, the mere lack of express authorization in any state for executing
fifteen-year-olds sufficed as a consensus, although not a clear-cut one, for Justice
O'Connor.'9" With respect to a juvenile petitioner, Justice O'Connor would be
faced with a consensus situation very similar to Atkins, where she signed on to
Justice Stevens's majority opinion.'99 In Atkins, the Court found without
hesitation that a national consensus existed against executing the mentally
retarded."' It is very likely that Justice O'Connor will also find a consensus to
exist when faced with a similar situation in the juvenile arena. Finally, because
Justice O'Connor did not concur but merely signed on to Justice Stevens's
majority opinion,"' she found that the Atkins majority reached the correct result
regarding the consensus issue. It is reasonable to assume that Justice O'Connor
will find more than merely "affirmative evidence" of a national consensus in the
juvenile context, with a similar number of states prohibiting the punishment in
question, and will, instead, find a "clear cut" consensus as she did in Atkins.
In Thompson, after finding a consensus, Justice O'Connor concluded that
Thompson's death sentence must be vacated because the Oklahoma statute did
not provide a specific "floor," or minimum age, below which no person could be
executed.02 Because the consensus was not clear-cut in Thompson, and because
the Oklahoma statute did not provide a floor, Justice O'Connor did not reach the
issue of whether a statute which did explicitly authorize the execution of fifteen-
year-olds would pass constitutional muster.0 3 Under the juvenile situation here,
however, this issue must be reached. As stated above, it is likely that the
193. Id. at 858 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
194. See supra Part I.E (describing Justice O'Connor's two-part test).
195. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 848-49, 857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
196. See supra Part III (discussing states' legislation prohibiting the execution ofjuveniles).
197. See supra note 128 (discussing the fact that the Washington Supreme Court has prohibited the
execution ofjuveniles in that state).
198. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 848-49, 857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
199. See supra Part ll.B.2 (discussing the determination that a national consensus was present inAtkins).
200. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002).
201. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 848 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
202. Id. at 857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 855 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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consensus regarding juvenile defendants is much stronger than the one found in
Thompson and, more importantly, Justice O'Connor will view the consensus at
issue here as a stronger or more clear-cut one.
An appeal to the Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of juvenile
executions must necessarily come from a state which does not prohibit such
executions. Twenty-one states permit the execution of seventeen-year-olds, 2° and
seventeen of these states also permit the execution of sixteen-year-olds. 20 5 Eleven
states have no minimum age in their death penalty statutes.2 6
A. Juvenile Appeal from a "Non-Precise State"
Assuming that a juvenile defendant appeals from one of these eleven "non-
precise" states, the issue for Justice O'Connor would be similar to the one in
Thompson .207 If a seventeen-year-old petitioner is before the Court, there would
be occasion to hold that all juvenile executions were unconstitutional. However,
if a sixteen-year-old is granted certiorari, under Thompson, Justice O'Connor
would apparently hesitate in holding that all juvenile executions were prohibited
211by a national consensus.
This would be a different situation than the one which faced the Court in
Thompson. As mentioned above, the consensus is much stronger here. In fact,
more states prohibit the execution of sixteen-year-olds (twenty-one) than
prohibited the execution of the mentally retarded before Atkins (eighteen). 2,
Moreover, there is only a one state difference between pre-Atkins states that had
legislation banning the execution of the mentally retarded (eighteen) and the
number of states which prohibit the execution of seventeen-year-olds
(seventeen). This is much more conclusive "evidence" of a national consensus
than that presented to the Court in Thompson.2"'
204. Necessarily, the four states which have determined seventeen to be the minimum age have done so
explicitly by either statute or judicial decision. See supra note 184 (listing the four states). Otherwise, the states'
laws concerning capital punishment would be ambiguous as to age and would thus be considered as allowing
the execution of sixteen-year-olds.
205. Of course, sixteen is the minimum constitutional age at which a person may be executed.
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.
206. See Death Penalty Information Center, Age Requirements for the Death Penalty and the Execution
of Juveniles, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.hp?scid=27&did=203#agereqs (last visited Oct. 21,
2003) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The eleven states are Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware,
Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah.
207. See supra Part Il.E (discussing Justice O'Connor's opinion in Thompson).
208. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (indicating that Justice O'Connor wished to decide
these cases on the narrowest possible grounds).
209. See supra note 166 (asserting that some evidence of a national consensus would suffice for Justice
O'Connor to proceed to the second part of her two part test).
210. See supra Part I II (weighing the likelihood of the existence of a national consensus opposed to the
execution of juveniles).
211. See supra Part II.E (discussing Justice O'Connor's opinion in Thompson).
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Therefore, consistent with her joining the Atkins majority, it is likely that
Justice O'Connor will hold that juvenile death sentences, under ambiguous or
"non-precise" death penalty statutes, are unconstitutional. 2 This would be the
case even if a sixteen-year-old defendant was before the Court, and it would not
be inconsistent with Justice O'Connor's Thompson concurrence. As the
overwhelming trend of state legislatures has been moving towards the prohibition
of juvenile executions, it is apparent that a national consensus is actually
developing in favor of prohibiting juvenile executions. In Thompson, Justice
O'Connor said that, absent affirmative and specific legislative evidence regarding
an emerging consensus, the Court should be hesitant when deciding the issue of
whether or not a consensus does exist.23 Here, there is much more evidence than
was present in Thompson, and a reasonable inference can be made that Justice
O'Connor would go along with the Stevens faction2 4 and hold that, because of
the strength of the consensus, all juvenile executions are prohibited under a non-
precise statute regardless of whether a sixteen or seventeen-year-old defendant is
before the Court.
B. Juvenile Appealfrom a "Precise State"
Assuming that a juvenile defendant appeals from one of the ten "precise"
states,25 the issue left open in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in
Thompson must be reached because of the strength of the national consensus. A
stronger consensus requires closer scrutiny; this was the result in Atkins.
2 6
As discussed earlier,"7 important factors in the Atkins analysis included the
number of states outlawing the execution of the mentally retarded and the
overwhelming trend in state legislatures outlawing these executions.2 8 The trend
is similar here, as discussed by Justice Stevens in his In re Stanford dissent.29Since Stanford v. Kentucky, four state legislatures220 and one state supreme
212. This position would also be consistent with Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Thompson. See
supra Part IL.E (discussing that opinion).
213. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 848-49 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
214. Justice Stevens, along with Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See supra Part II.D (discussing
the dissent written by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Souter, Ginbsburg, and Breyer inln re Stanford).
215. "Precise state" being defined as the states with seventeen as the minimum age for execution by
statute, the state with seventeen as the minimum age by judicial decision, and the states with sixteen as the
minimum age by statute.
216. See supra Part ll.B.2 (discussing the existence of a national consensus inAtkins).
217. See supra Part lI.B. I (describing the analysis to be undertaken in such a case).
218. See supra Part l1.B.2 (discussing the Atkins Court's considerations of legislation trends opposing
the execution of juveniles).
219. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 968-69, 971-72 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra Part
II.D (discussing Justice Stevens's dissent).
220. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing that four state legislatures have banned the
execution ofjuveniles since Stanford v. Kentucky, and listing those states).
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court22' have outlawed the execution of all juveniles. Another state has outlawed
the execution of sixteen-year-olds by supreme court decision.2 In this time
period, no state has lowered its minimum execution age.22 3
These trends, combined with the numerical similarities between state laws
concerning the execution of juveniles and the mentally retarded in Atkins, lead to
the conclusion that specificity alone is not sufficient to save the statutes of the
five states which specifically authorize execution of sixteen-year-olds and the
four states which specifically authorize the execution of seventeen-year-olds. The
evolving standards of decency test commands that, upon finding a national
consensus against a type of punishment, that punishment must be held
unconstitutional provided that the Justices accept that consensus. 24 This is true
regardless of any degree of specificity or precision in a state statute.
In Penry, Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion and found no national
consensus. In Stanford, Justice O'Connor concurred because she did not find a
national consensus to exist.22 In Thompson, as discussed above, Justice
O'Connor concurred while finding "affirmative evidence of a national
consensus. 27 The only case involving the execution of juveniles or the mentally
retarded where Justice O'Connor found a clear-cut national consensus was
Atkins."' Alas, the only case in which Justice O'Connor did not file an opinion
was also Atkins . 2 9 Because of her tendency to make her own statements in this
line of cases, it is certainly reasonable to infer that Justice O'Connor did not
concur in Atkins because she finally found the majority's consensus analysis as
an acceptable national consensus. Although Atkins dealt with the mentally
retarded, a similarly strong national consensus against executing juveniles should
persuade Justice O'Connor to accept the consensus.
221. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing the case in which the Washington Supreme
Court declared that the execution of juveniles in Washington is prohibited).
222. Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1,6 (Fla. 1999).
223. Although Kansas became a "death penalty state" in 1994, its minimum age for exeaution is
eighteen. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4622 (1995); see also supra note 175 (discussing Kansas's adoption of the
death penalty in 1994).
224. This is the test applied in Atkins. See supra Part II.B.3 (describing the application of that test). It is
reasonable to assume that the Stevens faction will go along with the consensus. Although Justice O'Connor has
not expressed her views as to whether "subjective" views should be considered, it appears likely that she would
hold against juvenile executions once the national consensus issue has been determined. See supra Part II.B.2
(discussing the finding of a national consensus in Atkins); see also supra Part II.E (discussing Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Thompson).
225. See supra Part II.A (discussing Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Penry).
226. See supra Part II.C (discussing Stanford v. Kentucky and Justice O'Connor's opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment of the Court).
227. Thompson v. Oklahoma 487 U.S. 815, 858 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra Part IL.E
(discussing Justice O'Connor's opinion concurring in the judgment of the Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma).
228. See supra Part lI.B (discussing Atkins v. Virginia).
229. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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Four Supreme Court Justices favor outlawing juvenile executions. A fifth,
Justice O'Connor, will likely join this block of four to hold that executing a
juvenile is unconstitutional as violating the Eighth Amendment's proscription of
"cruel and unusual" punishment.
V. CONCLUSION
The sad reality of contemporary life in America is that kids kill. From the
rash of school shootings in the past decade, including the Columbine massacre, to
the more recent sniper shootings in Washington D.C.,"' Americans have
witnessed numerous tragedies caused by children under the age of eighteen. At
the center of this issue is a legal question: What is the appropriate punishment for
these juvenile offenders? As discussed earlier,232 as little as fifteen years ago a
fifteen-year-old was sentenced to death. Up until that point and the Thompson
decision, it was not unconstitutional for such a sentence to be rendered and for
such a punishment to be carried out. Today, although fifteen-year-olds are safe
from the death penalty,233 sixteen and seventeen-year-olds are not. Juveniles of
these ages, including convicted sniper John Malvo, are more likely to commit
such devastating and tragic crimes as they approach the age of eighteen. They are
in a sort of "twilight zone" between childhood and adulthood, which is eighteen
in the eyes of the law. Until the Supreme Court rules otherwise, or until every
state has banned juvenile executions, these sixteen and seventeen-year-old
offenders remain subject to the death penalty in a number of states.
Although Atkins, on its face, does not appear to help these juveniles in terms
of avoiding the death penalty, a closer look reveals that Atkins may be just what
juveniles needed to do so. The reasoning of Atkins is similar to the reasoning in
the two most recent juvenile death penalty cases to come before the Supreme
Court, Thompson and Stanford.234 Atkins was decided thirteen years after the
Court in Penry determined that a national consensus against executing the
mentally retarded did not exist.233 The Atkins Court reached a different result than
the Penry Court in the face of an emerging national consensus against executing
the mentally retarded.236 Similarly, the Court will be faced with an emerging
national consensus against executing juveniles in a future case involving a
juvenile defendant. Thus, applying the same reasoning as was applied in Atkins,
the Court will likely find that, indeed, a national consensus has emerged against
230. See supra Part IL.D (discussing Justice Stevens's dissent in In re Stanford, in which Justice Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined).
231. See supra Part I (discussing John Malvo, one of the defendants convicted for the D.C. sniper
shootings, and who was seventeen years old at the time of his arrest).
232. See supra Part II.E (discussing Thompson v. Oklahoma).
233. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
234. See supra Part i1.B (discussing Atkins and the reasoning therein).
235. See supra Part I (discussing Atkins and its sharp departure from Penry).
236. See supra Part II.B (discussing Atkins and the emerging national consensus).
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executing juveniles. Therefore, the Court will likely follow suit and hold that
executing juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment's "evolving standards of
decency test." This result follows from Justice Stevens's dissent from denial of
habeas corpus in In re Stanford3 7 and Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Thompson,23 giving the Court the votes it needs to hold juvenile executions
unconstitutional .239
The issue of juvenile executions is a controversial one, and reasonable
people, even reasonable Supreme Court Justices, may disagree as to the
constitutionality and morality of such a practice. Regardless of one's personal
views, however, this is an issue which the Supreme Court will confront soon, and
the practice of executing juveniles in America will likely come to an end in the
near future.
237. See supra Part II.D (discussing Justice Stevens's dissent in In re Stanford).
238. See supra Part lI.E (discussing Justice O'Connor's opinion in Thompson).
239. See supra Part IV (considering the analysis and possible outcome resulting from the application of
Justice O'Connor's two-part test to such a case).

